Forward by Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO)

European national emergency response plans have long been focused on accidents at nuclear power plants and other nuclear installations. Recently, possible threats by disaffected groups have shifted the focus to being prepared for CBRN incidents in general. Although some countries may have adequate national plans for response, there is a need for European guidelines on how to act in the event of a CBRN incident.

[Signature]
Directorate-General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO)
Disclaimer

This publication is the outcome of non-exhaustive research into the arrangements within certain member states and other organizations (DE, DK, EE, IT, FR, NL, PL, SE, UK, USA, Canada, Norway, NATO, Interpol, UN, IAEA, OPCW) for a first response to CBRN incidents and does not necessarily represent the decisions or the stated policy by member states or other organizations researched. Whilst reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that the information contained within this Handbook is correct, you should be aware that the information contained within it may be incomplete, inaccurate or may have become out of date. Accordingly, the authors make no warranties or representations of any kind as to the content of this Handbook or its accuracy and accept no liability whatsoever for the same including, without limit, direct, indirect or consequential loss, business interruption, loss of profits, production, contracts, goodwill or anticipated savings. Any person making use of this Guidance does so at own risk and liability. The Guidebook and its Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) remain the property of the European Commission.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank............(to be inserted in complete Guidebook)
# Review & Amendment

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**Glossary of Terms**

The guidebook should contain abbreviations and terms in alphabetical order. It might include the following (It is recommended that the terms themselves remain consistent but it is recognized that their interpretation may very slightly throughout member states). The terms below are examples only taken from the TMT Handbook, further examples may be found in the full publication at ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp6-euratom/docs/tmt-handbook-20091.pdf

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Becquerel</strong></td>
<td>Measure of the rate of radioactive decay that corresponds to 1 atomic disintegration per second. It is used as a measure of the amount of a radioactive material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beta (β) radiation</strong></td>
<td>A charged particle ejected from the nucleus of a decaying atom. It includes electrons (negatively charged) and positrons (positively charged). Beta particles penetrate the outer skin layer, are not stopped in tissue as quickly as alpha particles, and produce less damage per living cell (low LET).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bioassay</strong></td>
<td>Procedures to evaluate internal contamination, including external monitoring for gamma emitting radionuclides, whole body counting and lung counting (in vivo analysis), and radiochemical analysis of excreta (e.g. urine) and other samples (in vitro analysis).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biodosimetry</strong></td>
<td>See Biological dosimetry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biological dosimetry</strong></td>
<td>Use of biological samples, usually taken from individuals who have been exposed to ionising radiation, to directly measure biological endpoints that can be correlated to absorbed radiation dose. Quantification of chromosome aberrations in peripheral lymphocytes (cytogenetic dosimetry) is the method of choice. See also Dosimetry.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A more general glossary might include terms as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorised personnel</td>
<td>Assisting personnel such as police, fire fighters, medical personnel and drivers and crews of evacuation vehicles called upon to respond within the cordoned zones. In addition, radiation specialists, radiation protection officers and radiological assessors who may respond to emergencies, should be considered as authorised personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection point</td>
<td>Location at the scene for taking care of and registering/identifying victims and goods. Different collection points are arranged for the uninjured, the injured, and the dead, as well as for goods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Ambulance</td>
<td>First ambulance personnel at the scene, who are responsible for communication and coordination within emergency medical services.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Can be radioactive, biological, or chemical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contamination Soiling/pollution with a hazardous substance</td>
<td>Can be radioactive, biological, or chemical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County medical Officer</td>
<td>Physician who, is responsible for planning, organizing, and leading infectious diseases control within the county.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decontamination agent</td>
<td>Powder or liquid that can be applied to skin exposed to a hazardous substance. The de-contamination agent absorbs and destroys the hazardous substance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decontamination area</td>
<td>Location at the scene where people are decontaminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirty bomb Explosive</td>
<td>Explosive device with a mix of radioactive substances, biological contagions, or chemical agents for dispersal and transmission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dose rate</td>
<td>A measure of the dose (energy) emitted per unit time for ionizing radiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E incident</td>
<td>Incident with explosive substances that comprise a danger through, for example:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• An accident.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Intentional detonation of an explosive charge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Dirty bomb, dispersal of radiological, biological and chemical agents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Use of conventional weapons.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Legal Status of this Guidebook

This Guidebook is established under Action H40 of the EU CBRN Action Plan as follows: “The Commission, together with the Member States, should facilitate the preparation of an EU Emergency Response Guidebook for first responders, based on existing national practices, applicable to the context of CBRN emergencies. The guidebook would be provided to the Member States free of charge and could be translated into all official EU languages. As part of the process of preparing an Emergency Response Guidebook, a stocktaking of existing documents/guidebooks should be conducted.”

Introduction

In February 2008, the Commission set up a CBRN Task Force to work on CBRN policy. Its final report of January 2009 provided the basis for the EU CBRN action plan. The main goal of CBRN policy is to minimize the threat and damage to the public from CBRN incidents. To this end, a coherent and prioritized EU CBRN Action Plan that involves all relevant stakeholders is implemented.

The EU Action Plan identifies three main areas of work:
- Prevention
  - Detection
  - Preparedness and Response.

This guidebook deals with preparedness and response and has, therefore, been produced to address the need for practicable advice to assist those preparing and responding to CBRN incidents. The Guidelines are necessarily generic in nature and are intended for the purpose of planning and training by Member State CBRN Emergency Response and support organizations, and for subsequent use in the field. It should be noted that no guidebook, however comprehensive, can deal with every eventuality and a flexible all-hazards approach may be needed when dealing with CBRN incidents.

Definitions

First Responder

For the purposes of this document, a First Responder is used as a general term for all emergency service personnel who are expected to respond to an incident. In the context of a CBRN incident a First Responder can be a member of the Emergency Services and members of specialist scientific, environmental or health service organisations only directly involved in Phases 1-4 (see below)

CBRN Incident

There are no commonly accepted definitions of CBRN materials, threats or incidents – for
example earlier EU policy documents in this domain merely refer to CBRN incidents without defining what these incidents could be. Other terminology related to CBRN materials refers to terrorist attacks using unconventional means - as opposed to the more conventional means of explosives and arms. In the military context, the terminology mainly refers to the use of non-conventional weapons, or WMD.

For the purpose of this document, however, it is most useful to use a rather broad description of a threat concerning CBRN materials: all uses of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substances and materials. When considering preparedness and response in this context, a CBRN incident may differ from a hazardous material (HAZMAT) incident in both effect scope and in intent. CBRN incidents are responded to under the assumption that they are deliberate malicious acts. As a consequence, evidence preservation and perpetrator apprehension are of greater concern with CBRN incidents than with HAZMAT incidents.

The above phases – determined from the analysis - can be encapsulated into the following:

**Phase 1  Preparation**
**Phase 2  Reaction**
**Phase 3  Operations**
**Phase 4  Immediate Aftermath/Recovery**
**Phase 5  Relief & Long-term Recovery**
**Phase 6  Remediation**
**Phase 7  Regeneration**
**Phase 8  Memorial**
Purpose and Scope of this Guidebook

This Guidebook is intended as guidance for those responsible for planning a multi-agency first response to CBRN incidents. It contains general advice on relevant topics that should be covered together with checklists of what actions should be taken. The Guidebook provides outlines toward a common approach to CBRN first response in the EU. Many member states already have First Responder handbooks and guidance. This guidebook is not intended to replace such material but to complement it. The Guidebook deals only with Phases 1 to 4 of an Incident as defined above.

How to use this Guidebook

Provide the reader of the guidelines with a description of the layout, its contents and interaction with the possible use of colour codes for Phase sections. However, care should be taken to allow printing of meaningful black and white versions of the document as the colour in its black and white form may inhibit the understanding of the appropriate section.

Global structure of the document, size of the paragraphs and figures, consistency of wording should facilitate further conversion of the content to an electronic version.
PHASE 1 – PREPARATION

Roles and Responsibilities

The guidebook should identify Agencies and Authorities, including International and EU liaison setting out their *roles and responsibilities* within a CBRN Incident. The following are examples of stakeholders within a CBRN incident context. These should be detailed further within Phase 3 – Operations at the scene of a CBRN incident:

Local Government
Regional Government
Federal Government (e.g. Central Federal Support Group)
International bodies – e.g. IAEA; EMSC
Inter Ministerial Crisis Group (Crisis Management Teams)
Scientific and Expert Teams
Forensic Teams
Decontamination squads
Environmental Protection
Law Enforcement
Fire Brigade
Health and Ambulance
Psycho-Social Assistance
EU Monitoring Information Centre (MIC)
Civil Protection
Civil Contractors under the authority of government bodies.
Health and Safety Inspection Teams (part of the Preparation Phase and immediate aftermath)
An organogram showing the relationship between key stakeholders would be helpful for guidebook users. An example is shown below.

**Example only**

*Organogram showing links from local to national/International level*

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**Preparatory Plans (See Annex A)**

This section should emphasize the importance of preparatory/contingency plans for dealing with CBRN incidents. It is suggested that an all hazards multi-agency approach is adopted (see Introduction to this document) with specific advice about forensic preservation of the scene and should also include sections on preparatory risk assessments, cordon procedures, evacuation plans for recognized risk areas, casualty centres, training and so on. The approach to plans and contingency arrangements may differ; some plans may deal only with policy and others may deal with more specific arrangements and resources. See Annex A for examples of types of Plan.

**Triggers for Contingency Plans and Alerts**

This section should emphasize the need for a consistent approach to recognizing the stage at which a CBRN incident should be triggered and a response initiated. Emergency Action Trigger Points (ETAP) need to be clear and concise. They can be based on the following **SMART** principle:

- **Specific** - It is essential to clearly define what the action relates to
- **Measurable** – Ensure that the action taken is acknowledged promptly
- **Action Oriented** – be specific and clear about what actions are to be taken and when
• Realistic – Do not have unrealistic expectations from your required actions
• Time Sensitive – Ensure that all actions are timely and prioritised

Risk Assessment

It is essential that thorough risk assessments are carried out of potential incident locations, for example COMAH (Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations) sites and potential city centre locations with potential for terrorist attack. The aspects to be covered include:

• Likelihood
• Potential
• Consequences (Damage assessment, both short-term and long-term)

The standard risk assessment methodology matrix can be adopted as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Insignificant (Minor problem easily handled by normal day to day processes)</th>
<th>Minor (Some disruption possible, e.g. damage equal to $500k)</th>
<th>Moderate (Significant disruption required, e.g. damage equal to $1 million)</th>
<th>Major (Operations severely damaged, e.g. damage equal to $10 million)</th>
<th>Catastrophic (Business survival at risk damage equal to $25 Million)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Almost certain (e.g. &gt;90% chance)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely (e.g. between 50% and 90% chance)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (e.g. between 10% and 50% chance)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely (e.g. between 3% and 10% chance)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rare (e.g. &lt;3% chance)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: After the Institute of Risk Management

Carrying out a forward risk assessment does not preclude the need for a dynamic risk assessment by first responders upon arrival at the scene – see Phase 3 in this template. The likelihood of an event occurring should, among other things, be based upon potential threats.

Countermeasures and Mitigation Strategies

Following a thorough risk assessment, countermeasures and mitigation strategies must be determined at potential incident sites. In general, these might include:

• Strategic Level:
Access arrangements and determination of cordons
Communications strategies—public awareness, and so on
Safety measures concerning people involved

- **Tactical Level:**
  Training and equipment for different methods to stop release, diminish dispersion, prevent re-suspension, prevent dispersion in soil and water, etc.
  Chemical knowledge, the importance of understanding different groups of substances’ potential to be airborne or the potential of causing injury to people or environment on short or long distance
  The time span from release to injuries – from minutes to days, possibility to evacuate or not, survival of B-agents etc.
  The importance of reading signs on the scene – could it be an intentional act?
  How many victims are lying down?
  The important issue on how to decide on the possible need of decontamination, which groups to decontaminate or not, etc.
  Forms of medical treatment
  Ethical and ethnical considerations
  Crisis communication – “go in, stay in, tune in”, pre-written forms etc.

- **Operational Level:**
  Location of cordons and controlled access points
  Triage and decontamination sites and equipment
  Casualty reception and loading points
  Procedures for handling the deceased
  Command and control locations
  PPE sites
  RVP

The points above can be issued as a stand alone checklist (for separate and independent use) as well as being included in the guidebook.

**Training & Exercises**

Training for all CBRN responders should be regularly carried out in realistic conditions as well as full live and table-top exercises at potential incident sites. Each aspect of CBRN should be tested and so on. Ensure equipment for training is available and tested. A training programme has also been set up with a view to improving the co-ordination of civil protection assistance interventions by ensuring compatibility and complementarity between the
intervention teams from the participating states. EU CBRN training and exercises are carried out on a regular basis.

**Simulation and Scenarios**

Regular live exercises can also help in testing the ability of emergency and specialist services to respond to a CBRN incident. It may be useful for the guidebook to contain some form of self-assessment process based on CBRN scenarios.

**Procurement of equipment and consumable materials**

The guidebook should refer to the (shortly to be drafted) EU Procurement manual for CBRN (under FP7 project *PRACTICE*). This will include reference to adopting *advance Framework Agreements* with CBRN civil contractors to ensure that resources are identified ahead of an incident and that the costs, delivery and nature of the resources are clearly identified to avoid time being wasted during the initial stages of an incident.

The EU Public Sector Procurement Directive, Article 32, defines a framework agreement as an agreement with suppliers, the purpose of which is to establish the terms governing contracts to be awarded during a given period, in particular with regard to price and quantity. In other words, a framework agreement is a general term for agreements with providers which set out terms and conditions under which specific purchases (call-offs) can be made throughout the term of the agreement. The framework agreement may, itself, be a contract to which the EU procurement rules apply. This would be the case where the agreement places an obligation, in writing, to purchase goods, works or services for pecuniary interest (or consideration in UK legal terminology). For this type of agreement, there is no particular problem under the EU rules, as it can be treated in the same way as any other contract.

However, the term is normally used to cover agreements which are not, themselves, covered by the definition of a contract to which the EU rules apply (though they may create certain contractually binding obligations). Such agreements set out the terms and conditions for subsequent call-offs but place no obligations, in themselves, on the procurers to buy anything. With this approach, contracts are formed, in EU Directive terms, only when goods, works and services are called off under the agreement. The benefit of this kind of agreement is that, because authorities are not tied to the agreements, they are free to use the frameworks when they provide value for money, but to go elsewhere if they do not.

It is this form of agreement, where the framework itself cannot be readily classifiable as a contract for the purposes of the current Directives, which has caused much difficulty in relation to the application of the EU procurement rules, and which is addressed explicitly in the new provision and covered in this note. But it should be stressed that the contractual status of a framework agreement should not cause undue concern; the key is that a means of awarding contracts under framework agreements is provided for without the need to re-advertise and re-apply the selection and award criteria from the outset.

**Maintenance of Equipment and consumable materials (See Annex B)**

Preparedness for a CBRN incident may involve the stockpile of equipment and consumable (including PPE), monitoring apparatus and time expired chemicals. It is essential that such equipment is regularly checked and tested and replaced as necessary. It may be practicable...
that during equipment maintenance regimes training can be conducted.

The guidebook should contain details of the type of equipment that should be retained together with their maintenance schedules. Particular care should be taken to ensure that perishable equipment, such as some PPE is regularly checked for damage and replaced as necessary.

**Typical equipment includes:**

CBRN First Responder Packs (to EU standards) including PPE suits
Chemical, Biological reservoirs (for fitting to respirators)
Chemical-Bio Escape Hoods
NBS Masks
Dosimeters
Hand held detection devices
Breathing Apparatus
Inflatable decontamination units and associated equipment
Inflatable Casualty Holding units
Identification tags (coloured)
Forensic checklists
Cordon and other signage

Some consumable equipment can be procured through framework agreements and supplied immediately on site by prior arrangement 24/7.
PHASE 2 - REACTION

Receipt of Information (See Annex C)
The guidebook should contain an explanation of the importance of first response information together with a checklist of important information that is required to enable a first response. A check list will cover a generic multi-agency requirement together with separate check lists for specialist requirements – e.g. 'scientific measures, health and so on. See Annex C for specific (hospital) and general examples of checklists.

Alert – Notification Process (See Annex D)
Understanding the need for a clear and concise alert process using standard situation report (SITREP) formats, together with the need to give pre-emptive alerts. The SITREP format and other reporting formats within a particular organization should be in the form of check lists. See Annex D.

Evaluation of Information
The guidebook should include steps to take in ensuring a proper evaluation of information exchanged – understanding the information requirements. A simple flowchart for evaluation might be as follows:
**Example Evaluation regime**

**Initial Response**

In any response it is vital to put the safety of life first – this should feature as a first principle within the Guidebook. Following Alert, Notification and Evaluation of information, first responders will assess the characteristics of the incident and establish a safe level of Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) prior to proceeding to the scene. Prior to arrival, the first responders will consider a site characterization to evaluate environmental hazards and importantly establish if it is a CBRN incident. They should begin to formulate a full response strategy and apply principles established through pre-planning. First responders will not normally have any containment or significant resources with them at this time. If local authorities or Regional/Federal/State responders identify an immediate threat to public health and safety, appropriate action shall be initiated by making arrangement for exclusion zones. If the situation warrants, an evacuation of the wider incident area may be implemented according to the procedures described in prepared plans. The first response On Scene Commander (see below) should contact the overall commander and report the details of the incident to ensure consistency of understanding. Procedures upon arrival at the scene are described in Phase 3 Operations. In particular agreement should be reached on the siting of cordons with respect to the prevailing wind direction at the scene. The wind prevailing at the scene may not always be the same as that at the starting point for emergency vehicles so care should be taken to get up to date information from the incident scene.

**Mobilization**

Measures for mobilization of resources and the need to ensure prioritization of specific skill sets for particular incident types needs to be taken into account and prepared for and should, therefore, be included within contingency plans. Check lists of equipment aboard emergency first response vehicles are invaluable in ensuring prompt mobilization. The sharing of crucial resources between EU member States should also be considered through the inclusion of the EU MIC. Early notification to the EU MIC is important to alert other member states to the potential that their resources may need to be mobilized.

The EU has a detailed mechanism for Civil protection that includes CBRN incidents as follows:

*Source: EU MIC website*

**The Mechanism’s tools**

The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection has a number of tools intended to facilitate both adequate preparedness as well as effective response to disasters at a community level. These can be briefly described as follows:

The **Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC)** is the operational heart of the Mechanism and is accessible 24 hours a day. It acts as a communication hub at headquarters level between participating states, the affected country and dispatched field experts. The MIC also plays a co-ordination role by matching offers of assistance put forward by participating states to the needs of the disaster-stricken country.

The **Common Emergency and Information System (CECIS)** is a reliable web-based alert and notification application created with the intention of facilitating emergency communication
among the participating states. It provides an integrated platform to send and receive alerts, details of assistance required, to make offers of help and to view the development of the ongoing emergency as they happen in an online logbook.

**Civil Protection Modules**

*Civil protection modules* are made of national resources from one or more Member States on a voluntary basis. They constitute a contribution to the civil protection rapid response capability called for by the European Council in the Conclusions in June 2005 and by the European parliament in its Resolution in January 2005 on the tsunami disaster. Thirteen civil protection modules have been identified by the Commission together with Member States. These include currently CBRN detection and sampling modules, and search and rescue modules in CBRN conditions.
PHASE 3 – OPERATIONS

Arrival at the Incident Scene

Dynamic Risk Assessment

Procedures for carrying out a dynamic risk assessment should be included within the guidebook. This type of risk assessment takes into account the most recent intelligence about the incident and ensures that no unnecessary risks are taken. This should be done even if a prior risk assessment has been carried out at the incident site (e.g. through pre-planning at known threat sites). The procedure for a dynamic risk assessment is similar to that for a full risk assessment discussed in Phase 1 of this template. A dynamic risk assessment is particularly important in the case of potential further threats from terrorist attack and should be repeated as the situation changes.

Safety Procedures On-scene

Upon arrival at the scene the safety of all personnel is of paramount importance. Therefore, the guidebook should contain reference to the protection of first responders, including personal protective equipment/clothing (also included within Initial Response). First aid and subsequent measures to be taken in the event of an accident/contamination of an individual/group. Decision to evacuate & welfare of personnel and public should be included with appropriate criteria.

Also included should be measures for dealing with the distressed public and personnel. The guidebook should include reference to the need for appropriate agencies outside of the outer cordon and beyond into the public arena. Criteria involved in evacuation of public and commercial areas should also be included. The main areas that should be covered in the guidebook are set out below.

Signs and Symptoms of CBRN Incident Type

Early detection of the contaminant present at the scene is vital. Some city buildings may be fitted with CBRN early warning systems, however, these are not common. Therefore, reliance is mainly placed on intelligence and early information back from the scene. There are some indications of the type of incident that can be listed:

- Chemical

There is a range of symptoms associated with a chemical incident, these include:

- Coughing, difficulty in breathing, skin irritation, skin burns, eye irritation. Collapse may be accompanied by unconsciousness, convulsions, nausea and vomiting may occur. Other symptoms may arise from particular types of chemical agent, such as nerve gas and mustard agents. The guidebooks should include the range of symptoms that first responders should consider in initially assessing the hazard that victims have been exposed to when the hazard is unknown when entering the incident site. Chemical incidents are characterized by the rapid onset of symptoms (minutes to hours) and easily observed signatures (coloured residue, dead foliage, pungent odour, and dead insect and animal life).
• **Biological**

In the case of a biological incident the onset of symptoms typically takes days to weeks and there are no characteristic signatures. Because of the delayed onset of symptoms in a biological incident, the area affected may be greater due to the migration of infected individuals.

![Image of biological contamination]

• **Radiological and Nuclear**

In the case of a radiological or nuclear incident, the onset of symptoms requires days to weeks and there typically will be no characteristic signatures. Radiological materials are not recognizable by the senses, and are colourless and odourless.

The guidebook should contain reference to the symptoms associated with different types of incident and should include examples based upon experience to enable first responders to readily recognise the type of contamination agent.

Reference should be made to dosimeters and other devices for CBRN agent detection.

![Image of radiological and nuclear detectors]

First responders should also be aware of hazard signage; the guidebook should contain reference to the most common signs. For example:

- Corrosive
- Oxidising
- Flammable
- Explosive
Harmful

Irritant

Toxic

Biohazard

Environmental hazard

Radiation
Typical CBRN Incident Scene:

Public and Traffic (including aviation and shipping) Exclusion Zones Downwind of Incident
Roles and Responsibilities of the Emergency and Specialist Services at the Scene

Each of the components of the incident scene requires a lead service. The guidelines should contain specific roles and responsibilities of the emergency and specialist services that have lead responsibility for each of the incident scene components. Responsibilities may differ among member states but in the examples below it is assumed that member states have: Police, Fire, Ambulance, and Medical (paramedic/emergency doctor) services available for a response to a CBRN Incident. The suggested lead responsibility for each of the scene components identified below in RED is identified against each heading together with suggested support services. Within each section the guidelines should contain specific details of the involvement of the emergency and specialist service.

CBRN Incident Scene – Components, Activities and Equipment and Responsible Agencies

Rendezvous Point (RVP) - Police

It is common for emergency and specialist vehicles and personnel to meet at a pre-determined RVP prior to taking action at the scene. This will ensure that action is taken in a planned order and that cordons are properly established with controlled access points before any action is taken. It should also avoid emergency vehicle congestion and access to the scene being blocked. It is usual for the RVP and cordon areas to be set up upwind of the incident and for all traffic and public access stopped downwind of the incident scene. The plan of action is decided among the emergency services at the RVP together with the location of cordons, command and control, holding areas and access points. The Guidebook should be clear about the process of establishing RVPs and the need for advice to emergency and specialist services arriving at the scene.

Cordons - Police

There are generally three types of cordon:

- **Innermost (Hot Zone)**
  The innermost cordon contains the incident scene and related activity. It is commonly referred to as the ‘hot zone’;

- **Inner Zone (Warm Zone)**
  The inner zone, commonly referred to as the ‘warm zone’ comprises the majority of incident activity and contains initial medical and in-depth triage, Mass Decontamination, various holding areas, and the command and control centre;

- **Outer Zone (Cold Zone)**
  Commonly referred to as the ‘cold zone’, this comprises are reception areas outside of the warm zone, including hospitals, temporary mortuary, reception centres and the casualty bureau. It also contains the RVP for emergency and specialist services.
The innermost and inner cordons are accessed only through ‘Controlled Access’ points. All activity in this area should be documented and the procedures included within the guidebook. All cordons are established downwind of the incident. All public and vehicular access is restricted at an appropriate distance upwind of the incident site at a distance appropriate to the incident type; for example, a chemical or biological incident may justify a greater restricted distance that a radiological incident. Consideration should also be given to aviation exclusion zones above the incident scene to avoid contamination and to restrict the access of media aircraft into a potentially contaminated area. The guidebook should contain reference to all such procedures within the member state for the establishment of appropriate exclusion zones on the surface and in the air, and if necessary, at sea.

**Personal Protective Clothing – Fire Service supported by Police and Medical services**

All responders must take all necessary measures to protect themselves before entering the contaminated area (innermost zone). The use of PPE is therefore essential to protect airway, skin and eyes. The guidebook should contain full details of available PPE and its use. Appropriate training should be given in PPE use. Generally, there are 4 levels of PPE for dealing with hazardous substances, those for dealing with radioactive materials may differ and should be highlighted within the guidebook:

- **Level 1** – fully encapsulated suit, with over-gloves and over-boots integrated into the suit. Respiratory protection is a self-contained breathing apparatus. Level 1 PPE is required for entry into an unknown substance incident hot zone, but where the substance is not caustic;
- **Level 2** – comprises a hooded suit, double gloves, over-boots, and a self-contained breathing apparatus. Level 2 PPE should be used only after a hazardous substance has been identified and when adequate oxygen in the environment has been confirmed;
- **Level 3** – Similar to Level 2, but uses an air-purifying respirator instead of the self-contained breathing apparatus. Level 3 should only be used after a hazardous substance has been identified and upon adequate oxygen being verified;
- **Level 4** – generally no respiratory protection and coveralls only.

It is essential that monitoring arrangements are in place for the time that PPE has been in use. It is common practice for the time that an individual puts on the PPE to be written on the back of the suit. Different practices may be adopted in different member states and these should be contained within the guidebook. Such procedures should also include the time-limits for wearing PPE, designation of those responsible for checking individuals wearing PPE and their safety and the procedure for carrying out these checks, for example, one team member may be responsible for checking another – eyes, demeanour and so on.
Activity within the Hot Zone

Approaching the Scene – Fire and Police Services

Establish the wind direction and ensure that the scene is approached upwind. When approaching a scene that may involve chemical, biological, or radiological materials the most critical consideration is the safety of responders. It is important to be aware that the presence and identification of hazardous agents may not be immediately obvious, especially in the case of biological and radiological incidents. There are actions and measures that should be considered by first responders that are applicable to either a chemical, biological, or radiological (or nuclear) incident. The guidance should be general in nature, not all encompassing, and its applicability should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the first responders. Particular techniques for approaching the scene and actions/measures to be taken should be included within the guidebook.

On-Scene Triage, Rescue of Survivors, and Recovery of the Deceased – Fire Service supported by medical services

Immediate triage should be carried out by the first responders entering the incident scene. This is a rapid categorization of victims to assess those who may need immediate medical care, such as those unconscious or clearly otherwise incapacitated from those who can leave the incident site under limited supervision. In the first instance, such categorization can be limited to 2 types: acute and non-acute. Each can be tagged, for example, acute=red, non-acute=green. The victims should leave the site through the controlled access point. Procedures for the rapid assessment and categorization of victims should be contained within the guidebook.

Survivors should be despatched to the medial triage point through the controlled access point. The deceased should likewise be taken to the medical triage point for confirmation of death before being decontaminated. Procedures for the handling of the dead should be set out in the guidebook together with particular considerations based on cultural, religious and other diversity issues.

Preservation of the Scene – Potential Forensic Evidence – Police supported by Fire Service

Measures should be taken by first responders to preserve any potential evidence at the scene that may
assist in investigation and or criminal prosecutions. Check list of steps to be observed together with reporting forms and marking terminology and signs. However, it is important to ensure that the saving of lives is prioritized ahead of the gathering of forensic evidence.

One of the most basic—and most important—tasks a crime scene officer has is locating, collecting, packaging, and marking evidence found at an incident that may be a potential crime scene. No matter the type of scene, it is important to carefully mark and record every piece of evidence found. This may be complicated when there are multiple potential crime scenes or incidents; the Guidebook should include advice about coordinating evidence across crime scenes. By developing a system for marking evidence before you arrive at your crime scenes, you will avoid confusion and build stronger cases. This approach should be included within preparedness planning.

There are many possible systems that can be used to mark evidence. Some forensic departments use a combination of numbers and letters, or include a breakdown that specifies locations such as room 1, room 2, outdoors, vehicle, etc. It doesn’t matter what system is used as long as it is clear and consistent. The system must be clear to anyone working at the site of the incident.

### Activity in the Inner (Warm) Zone

**Medical Triage & Casualty Tagging – Medical Services**

Following initial and basic triage within the inner (hot) zone by, usually non-medical, first responders, a medical triage of victims should take place immediately upon their entry into the inner (warm) zone by qualified medical personnel familiar with triage arrangements. Victims are usually classified into 4 categories:

- **1. IMMEDIATE** – those who will dies without immediate medical intervention – Colour Code: RED
- **2. INTERMEDIATE** – those who also need urgent medical intervention but who can wait a few hours – Colour Code: YELLOW
- **3. DELAYED PRIORITY** – those who need medical treatment but which can safely be delayed – Colour Code: GREEN
- **4. DEAD** – those who have been declared dead by a qualified medical person, usually a doctor - Colour Code: BLACK

Walking wounded are normally classified as DELAYED PRIORITY. This classification is usually related to the consideration that a favourable outcome is predicted. Those who can proceed directly to the decontamination area should be advised to do so to save triage time. Detailed arrangements for medical triage, including tagging, should be included within the guidebook.
Decontamination Area – Medical Services supported by Fire Service

The guidebook should contain details of decontamination processes and procedures for all types of CBRN incident. The approach to each may be different and require different levels and intensity of decontamination. The principles of decontamination are as follows:

- Decontaminate as soon as possible;
- Decontaminate by triage priority;
- Decontaminate only what is necessary;
- Decontaminate as close to the innermost (hot) zone as possible to avoid unnecessary contamination of the inner (warm) zone;
- REMEMBER that first responders as well as victims can become contaminated and require decontamination.

Trained and qualified triage personnel should set the priority for decontamination based upon the priority of triage. The priority of decontamination will depend upon the state of the victim and the nature of the contaminant.

Decontamination is NOT an automatic response to CBRN incidents. The decision to initiate the decontamination process will depend upon an assessment of the nature of the incident by first responders. It is, therefore, essential that good communication links exist between the first responders in the innermost (hot) zone and those at the command and control site in the inner (warm) zone, and that an early assessment is made to avoid unnecessary action.

The guidebook should include procedures for innovative decontamination by first responders, as this may be necessary prior to the arrival of proper decontamination equipment and personnel.
Casualty Clearance Station (CCS) – Police supported by Medical Services

Casualty Clearing Stations (CCS), are normally set up by ambulance personnel as they can often provide a focal point for further in-depth triage; for example, some victims may not show symptoms of being affected by the contaminant until they have been through initial medical triage and decontamination.

The location of the CSS must be considered carefully and may be sited in an existing structure or an inflatable resource within the inner (warm) zone. The procedures within the CSS should be set out in the guidebook and should comprise identification processes and secure labelling procedures. Speed of handling is essential to avoid delays in getting the most seriously affected casualties to the ambulance loading point through the survivor holding area. The CSS should be close to the various loading points.

Loading Points – Police supported by Ambulance Service

There should be three loading points within the inner (warm) zone close to the outer cordon (cold zone) and within easy reach of the controlled access into the inner (warm) zone. The loading points are:

- Deceased loading point – for the transfer of dead bodies to temporary mortuaries;
- Survivor loading point – for those able to be taken to the survivor rest centre and do not require hospital treatment;
- Ambulance loading point – for those victims who require hospital treatment.

It is important that loading points have ease of ingress and egress and that there path is not blocked by emergency and other vehicles. Therefore, the location of the loading points is important and should be carefully considered at the outset of the incident. It is the responsibility of the Ambulance Service to notify the receiving hospital of incoming casualties together with their condition. The guidebook should contain procedures for the transport and notification of contaminated casualties to hospitals.

Property Stores - Police

Arrangements should be made to establish covered property stores with suitable tagging for clothing and other items. The store should only accept items that have been decontaminated or have not been contaminated. Items should be listed, preferably by individual name. Items without any clear identity should be labelled with the location found together with the name of the first responder.

Command & Control – Police supported by all emergency & medical services

Command and control can be defined as an exercise of authority and direction by a commander over the emergency and support services under their jurisdiction responding to the incident to ensure a successful outcome. Although the resources remain under the operational command and control of their parent body they will be coordinated by the On Scene Commander. For their respective resources they command & control the following:
• Personnel
• Equipment
• Communications
• Vehicles
• Health & Safety aspects
• Shift patterns and rest periods

**Co-ordination - Police**

Note that the scale of Coordination will be dependent on the scale of the incident and the option to refer to a higher level. To ensure the synchronization of resources to best effect it is essential that the incident is coordinated overall by a single responsible officer. Among other things the Co-ordinating Officer is responsible for:

• Organizing, monitoring, and ensuring the command & control of all on site services/resources
• Assigning/allocating resources to the incident in response to requests or in anticipation of need
• The efficient pursuit of incident objectives – resolution of the incident
• Briefing the superior command level
• Ensuring that cordons and exclusion zones are maintained and removed when unnecessary
• Designation appropriate subordinate levels of command at tactical and operational level
• Briefing the assigned press officer and participating in press conferences as appropriate
• Timely notification to participating units of changes to the incident status

**Communications (Refer to Annex E for Example Com Plan) – All Services**

The guidebook should contain reference to the organization needed for a clear command and control framework able to co-ordinate the first response to CBRN incidents together with communications advice and the need for straightforward control. It is essential to have a pre-determined communication plan. The guidebook will need to include an example communication plan and an example is attached at Annex E.

**Levels of Command**

Within the command & control structure of an incident there are various levels of co-ordination. These can be (and each will require their own set of guidelines within the guidebook but at generic level only):

- **State Co-coordinating body and designated person - Police**

  Consideration should be given to the inclusion within the guidebook to a lead government department within the Member State together with a single controlling officer (not the on-scene commander but with overall strategic responsibilities for the incident) able to direct and command all aspects and all agencies involved within the incident at strategic level and reporting back to the lead government minister within the Member State. This type of role is important in the context of EU liaison, for example in the case of a Bio-incident where inter-border coordination is required.

- **On scene commander (OSC) - Police**

  The OSC is the overall commander at the site of a CBRN incident at tactical level – an officer nominated to command the actions at tactical level at the incident site. They are responsible for the duties as set out under ‘Coordination’ above.
• **Incident Officers – Police, Fire, Ambulance, Paramedic**

Incident officers are responsible for the command of their respective service assets. They report directly to the OSC and ensure that he is kept up to date with developments within their jurisdiction. Each service present at the scene should have an assigned incident officer who is familiar with his/her agency’s resources and operating procedures and competent to handle a CBRN incident. They are also responsible for maintaining communication links with other incident officers as appropriate to their organization’s role and the nature of the incident.

**On site expertise – As Required**

The guidebook should contain a section on ‘on-site’ expertise and refer to the need to ensure that scientific expertise appropriate to the nature of the incident is available. The appropriate personnel should be included within the preparation for a CBRN incident notification list. It is important to remember that all incidents are different, even those under a common C, B, R or N category, therefore, flexibility is needed in the guidelines provided.

**Environmental Health – Police supported by Fire and Medical Services**

The guidebook should contain criteria for ensuring that the operating environment is kept safe for those working at the scene in the inner and innermost cordons and within the outer cordon. Care should also be taken to review the extent of each cordon as the incident progresses.

**Public Information and the Media (See Annexes F & G for a Generic Plan and Press release) – Police and Local Authorities**

The guidebook should include a section explaining the importance of handling the media and setting out the measures to be taken to set up an appropriate response to media relations and communications involving (see Annex F and G):

- Co-ordination
- Weighting of information released (so as to avoid unnecessary reactions of panic)
- Initial Actions
- Media Centre
- Media Access
- VIP/Observer visits
- Press releases/check list/content/pre formatting (see example at Annex G)

**Activity in the Outer (Cold) Zone**

**Casualty Bureau - Police**

A Casualty Bureau allows information to be recorded in different formats and provides modules for the management of documents, exhibits, actions, disclosure and case preparation. Incidents can be linked within and across law enforcement agencies for the co-ordination of enquiries within the EU and international community. The Casualty Bureau function provides a means for searching and creating records for missing persons, casualties and survivors and the identification of potential matches.

The setting up of a web-based system for recording information about those involved in the CBRN incident is extremely helpful in sharing information. For example, in the UK (source: National Police Improvement Agency) a web enabled front end (CasWeb) allows the police to provide a call-taking and data-entry facility.
to assists with a high profile crime enquiry or a major disaster through a procedure known as 'mutual aid'. CasWeb allows mutual aid forces to create, search and update records (missing persons, callers, survivors and casualties) and record messages on the host force's system.

The establishment of a single public telephone number for casualty enquiries which can be given to the media is also advisable. This can be pre-arranged and included within pre-planning.

**Dealing with the Deceased – Ambulance Service**

Arrangement should be made to ensure that the deceased are handled with dignity and with due speed. Care should also be taken to respect religious and racial differences. The deceased should be decontaminated before processed into the holding unit. As soon as possible they should be transported to temporary mortuaries which should have been set up at the outset of the incident in pre-determined locations. Details of the deceased should be passed to the Casualty Bureau.

**Survivor Rest Centres – Local Authorities**

Survivor rest centres should be established at the outset of the incident close to the outer zone in pre-determined locations. The opportunity should be taken to check the details of survivors and report them to the Casualty Bureau.

**Hospitals – Medical Authority**

Hospitals would have been placed on alert following notification of the incident ready to accept casualties. Care should be taken to ensure that upon arrival at the hospital details of those arriving should be checked and not confused with other casualties arriving from unrelated incidents. Details of those involved in the CBRN incident should be reported to the Casualty Bureau for checking.
PHASE 4 – IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH & RECOVERY

Immediate Site Recovery
Guidelines should be included about leaving the incident site and ensuring that the cordons are re-assessed and that any exclusion zones put in place are reviewed and removed as necessary. It is important also to ensure that all appropriate equipment is recovered and properly decontaminated and maintained for future use as soon as possible. Some equipment, such as monitoring equipment, may need to be left at the site, therefore security of the equipment is essential. Potential sources of secondary incident have to be secured (utility infrastructure, gas, water …)

Multi-Agency De-briefing
The importance of immediate aftermath briefing to capture lessons learned, including:

• Need for de-briefing
• Initial de-briefing (hot level)
• Multi-agency debriefing
• MS de-briefing
• Recognized psychological care

It is important that guidance on the style and time scale for briefings is included. For example, a hot debrief should be completed within days of the incident being closed and not left for weeks or even months. Debriefing whilst the incident is still fresh in the minds of those involved is essential. It is also recommended at individual units involved in the incident from participating organizations hold their own hot debrief prior to that for all agencies (multi-agency debrief).

Whether or not EU resources where called upon during the incident it is important that DG Home Affairs is debriefed as soon as possible highlighting any immediate lessons that have been learned to ensure promulgation throughout member states.

The nature of long-term conferences and debriefing arrangements are considered to be outside the scope of these guidelines.
## Annexes

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ANNEX A

Examples of Plans

From City of London Police CBRN Policy:

Section A - Policy Detail

A.1 C.B.R. N. Policy

A.1.1 Introduction

This policy identifies how the City of London Police, in partnership with other agencies, proposes to deal with any incidents involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) materials. The policy is designed to provide reassurance to the community on the Force’s ability to respond effectively to such an incident and to set out the framework required for planning, training and equipping staff to undertake a CBRN role.

A.1.2 Policy

The City of London Police in conjunction with the other Police Services in London and our Emergency Service Partners and other agencies will ensure that contingency plans and procedures are in place to deal with any CBRN type incident at strategic, tactical and operational levels of command. Terrorism is nothing new, it has been around since individuals or groups determined that they could achieve their goals, or at least gain attention for themselves, through the use of fear and physical threat. The concept of CBRN Terrorism is not new either. As a direct result of the threat to the UK, and London in particular, it is necessary to have a range of options to respond to terrorist activity. The City of London is the identified heart of the Country’s financial industry and the co-location, within such a small area, of many major national and international institutions and iconic sites make it a prime target for any terrorist attack.

It is stressed that while the threat to the UK from terrorists remains the use of CBRN is only one of the options available to them. The term CBRN should only ever be used in the context of a deliberate and malicious act to cause harm or fear amongst a population by using or threatening to use CBRN materials and substances. It is crime focused and may range, in terms of investigation, from cases of causing harassment and alarm with hoaxes through the spectrum of criminal offences to mass murder or genocide.

The potential scale of a real CBRN incident should not be underestimated. It will call for joint operations involving a multi-agency approach. CBRN Counter Terrorism is a national problem which requires national responses, where individual Forces will prepare local plans based on common national procedures, standards and doctrine. Accidental and conventional chemical incidents/spillages and radiological discharges are not subject to this Policy and are to be dealt with in accordance with existing HAZMAT procedures. CBRN Policy

Section B - Supporting Information

B.1 Current Procedure

B.1.1 Is this a revision of a current policy?

Yes

B.1.2 If ‘No’ to above, how is this policy area currently managed?

N/A

B.2 Requirement for Policy

B.2.1 Need

The City of London Police requires this policy to provide reassurance to the community that the Force is trained and equipped to deal with any CBRN type incident should it be necessary. The policy sets the standards required for staff members to be trained and regularly refreshed in their roles. The policy provides information on the joint agency
working that is currently being undertaken by individual organisations engaged in delivering the CBRN response

B.2.2 Benefits

The benefits of this policy are to:

• Provide reassurance to the community that City of London Police staff are trained, equipped and prepared to deal with any incident involving a CBRN element;

• Ensure that only those members of staff who have received appropriate training and are deemed medically fit to deploy in personal protective equipment are permitted to do so.

• Reassure the community that the City of London Police has contingency plans and procedures in place to identify a CBRN incident at the earliest time and assign the most appropriate resources to deal with that incident, thereby minimising casualties and disruption to the City of London.

• Provide reassurance that the City of London Police has established effective working relationships with partner agencies to enable CBRN incidents to be dealt with effectively.

• The following websites contain useful information on Terrorism and related matters, including CBRN:

  www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security
  www.londonprepared.gov.uk
  www.mi5.gov.uk
  www.ukresilience/infoCBRN

B.2.3 Risks

The risks to the City of London Police if this policy is not in place are significant. The Force will be unable to respond effectively and efficiently to a real or suspected CBRN incident. This will lead to an inability to re-assure our community that the Force has contingency plans and procedures in place to identify a CBRN incident at the earliest time and assign the most appropriate resources to deal with that incident, thereby minimising casualties and disruption to the City of London.

B.2.4 Resource & Training Implications

This policy will have minimal impact on the City of London Police. The Force has been training staff members since 1999 for a CBRN type incident. The Force has also been working closely with other agencies to ensure a co-ordinated approach and response to such incidents. This policy merely documents the work that the City of London Police has already undertaken in this area and the work that will continue to be undertaken, as a National requirement.

Resources – Initial Home Office national guidance required that every Force should train, as a minimum, 5% of their Force. The City of London Police has achieved this target. Current planning within the Home Office may seek an increase in capacity and capability however this is subject to negotiation and agreement at this time. Abstractions for CBRN training will have an impact on operational policing, however, these abstractions are considered essential. Maintaining skills and re-accreditation are the areas which need to be planned in to ensure that staff remain qualified for their roles.

The Home Office has agreed funding streams to initially equip all CBRN responders. Replacement PPE issues and any further issue to newly trained officers must be funded by the Force. The Force has identified that the costs, during 2007/08 financial year, to equip replacement CBRN officers as well as to upgrade essential CBRN technical equipment and procure new equipment will be in the region of £30,000.

Training -

CBRN Responder - Initial CBRN responder training is delivered at the Metropolitan Police Specialist Training Centre, Gravesend, at minimal cost to the Force (two public order instructors attached – partly to deliver CBRN training) –
Operation Wormwood protocol with Metropolitan Police.

Command Training – Initial National CBRN command training continues to be delivered at Winterbourne Gunner at minimal cost to the Force. Annual seminars and table-top exercises are also delivered at no cost to the Force.

Refresher Training –

In-force refresher training for CBRN responders will commence during 2007/08 following the training to national standards of 2 members of the Support Group and 1 member of the TFG. Annual refresher training is considered essential and a national requirement of two days per year is set by the Home Office and mandated for all CBRN trained officers. In London there is an additional requirement to train and exercise with Metropolitan Police and British Transport Police CBRN teams under the Guardian Forces agreement. This additional training will require two days annually and will CBRN Policy consist of one-day kit & equipment safety briefing, respirator testing and a CBRN threat briefing and one-day joint Forces exercising. The annual refresher training commitment is therefore 4 days per CBRN trained officer. This mandatory training will affect the Support Group and those members of the TFG who are CBRN trained and must be included alongside other role specific training. The Police National CBRN Centre has developed, at no cost to Forces, a series of DVD training aids for CBRN Commanders however Command Refresher Training has been devolved to Forces and therefore training events such as tabletop exercises will have cost implications.

B.3 Related Documents

ACPO CBRN Strategic 3-5 year Policy Operation Wormwood Multi-Agency National Concept of Operations (ManConOps) for CBRN terrorism National CBRN Operations Manual

B.4 Attached Standard Operating Procedures

SOP - Command & Control
SOP - Operational Response

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**Extract from Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency – Emergency Response to Incidents Involving Hazardous Substances:** From source Swedish Response to CBRN Incidents

**Introduction**

Incidents involving hazardous substances may have very serious consequences for the people affected, for society as a whole and for the emergency response personnel involved in the incident. Collective planning and interaction are required in order to implement effective response measures. We will be presenting here a number of development projects, both completed and in progress, such as:

- national reinforcement resources intended to support the municipal fire & rescue services in the case of incidents involving hazardous substances
- first on scene, a brochure formulated for the fire & rescue services, medical services and police
- recommendations for creation of measures for better cooperation between “blue light authorities”
- training, etc.

The purpose of this brochure is to provide an overview of work completed and in progress. Several of these projects involve partnerships between the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the Swedish National Police Board, the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, et al.

Detailed information will be available on the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency website at www.msbmyndigheten.se/farligaamnen

Hazardous substances guidelines, 2015. In consultation with the Swedish Coast Guard and the Swedish Maritime Administration and other organisations involved – the focus for damage limitation in the case of incidents involving hazardous substances at sea and on land is described. This report reviews risks in respect of objectives and
measures before, during and after accidents involving hazardous substances. No drastic changes can be predicted, but in the longer term volumes, numbers of transports and the distribution of hazardous substances will be affected. One reason for this may be the fact that there is a certain degree of slowness in the system. Extensive transport networks such as railways cannot be constructed in a short time. The EU’s general control in its REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals) regulation will have a major impact due to the fact that fewer hazardous substances will be permitted in future.

Renewable fuels are on the increase, while at the same time environmental awareness means that change is demanding more of mankind and its skills. This report provides suggestions for the focus of improvement work for the future. These national reinforcement resources can be used as support for the local fire & rescue services in the case of complex incidents and for planned events such as major sports events, major international summits and state visits.

National resources – in terms of both personnel and equipment – must support the local fire & rescue services in the case of incidents involving hazardous substances.

The following resources are available:

- **Chemical unit**
  *Rescue service in a chemical environment.*

- **Decontamination unit**
  *Decontamination of operational personnel, and also lifesaving decontamination of individuals in the case of planned events.*

- **Detection unit**
  *To identify and analyse any unknown substances at the site of an incident.*

- **Chemical coordinators**
  *Will support the work of the municipalities in their region for planning and preventing incidents involving hazardous substances, but not in an operational capacity.*

- **Oil combating depot**
  *Will support municipalities affected by oil spills on beaches adjoining State waters. This support aims to provide both equipment and personnel. National reinforcement resources may also provide international aid in the case of incidents involving hazardous substances.*
Annex B

Example of simple equipment maintenance regime
Modified the authors from The Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company Maintenance Regime.

OPERATION
Continued safe operation of your equipment/clothing depends on regular maintenance and testing of the equipment and its operating and protective controls/environment. The tests and checks outlined below are designed to determine whether or not the equipment and controls are in good operating condition. An appropriate log sheet should be used to guide you and document results.

REPAIRS
Should any check or test indicate that the equipment being tested or observed is not in good operating condition it should be repaired/replaced immediately. Record and maintain records of repairs or changes so that a complete record will be available for review at any time.

RECORDS
Equipment procedures and maintenance guidelines should be kept in a central location for quick reference when needed. If missing, request complimentary copies from manufacturer or maintenance contractor.

INSTRUCTIONS
Read and follow all manufacturers’ guidelines and instructions for periodic service, maintenance and inspection of equipment and systems.

PREPARE!
Educate key employees in these procedures.

DON’T WAIT FOR EQUIPMENT FAILURE!
Annex C

Examples of a Hospital and General information checklists for the receipt of information

*From CBRN Incidents: clinical management & health protection, Health Protection Agency UK*

Many, if not all, major incidents, accidents or outbreaks will be followed by an investigation.
It is therefore very important that your records are comprehensive, contemporary, and legible.
Incident management records should include the details of ALL advice given or received, and ALL actions taken to protect yourself, staff, patients or the public, or to inform others. Time, date and sign them all.
You may find the form below, which may be freely copied, helpful – it may not cover everything, so amend it as necessary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident advice record form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hospital/Trust:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Incident:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task/query</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff protection/PPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational lockdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turning off air-conditioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patient containment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decontamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patient investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patient treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-exposure prophylaxis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who to inform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## INITIAL INFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Incident Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What happened?</th>
<th>Wind Direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outside air temperature</th>
<th>Temp. in the area of the spill</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When did it happen?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Where did it happen?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who reported it?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For any of the following questions answered "No", list the planned action items below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has the area been evacuated?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If evacuated, have all employees been accounted for?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has facility management been notified?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Corporate Offices been notified?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has the Fire Department been notified?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has the Police Department been notified?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has LEPC been notified?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has the National Response Center been notified?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were there any injuries?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An example of SITREP guidance from


- Send the first Sitrep as early as possible, and send subsequent sitreps daily with whatever information is available at the time. Do not delay because certain information is lacking; send it next time.
- A Sitrep should be sent once a day unless specified otherwise.
- Remember, a Sitrep is processed information and carries considerable credibility.
- It should be informative, authoritative and timely - especially in the current age of instant media access to disaster sites.
- Either provide a complete list of unmet needs in each report, or specifically state which items remain unchanged from the previous report while providing new information for other items.
- Indicate if needs can be met locally or require international assistance.
- When writing the report, imagine yourself at the receiving end, and try to write what you would want to know as well as how you would want it presented. Be explicit and precise and double check figures.
- Try to anticipate a potential donors likely questions, and answer them in the report.
- Do not repeat information that has already been sent, and if there is no new information under a specific heading, state this clearly.
- Avoid vague and ambiguous words and phrases. A statement such as “5,000 people are affected” does not give any indication on, e.g. how they are affected, to which degree, what is already being done, and how many people there are in the area altogether. “5,000 houses damaged” conveys little information. The damage” may be minimal or total. Use the guidelines given in the assessment checklist. Describing people as being “homeless” also lacks the precision needed to plan appropriate responses. At a minimum make the following distinctions:
  - People homeless before the disaster (chronic homeless).
  - Those temporarily evacuated due to repairable damage to dwellings.
  - People whose dwellings have been destroyed or irreparably damaged.
  - When reporting damage or assessed needs, specify the source of the information. Take care to check the final text before sending - ask another person to check it.
Example Situation Report Format (From United Nations Field format)

The format of the Situation Report given below should be followed by using the parts that are relevant for the specific assessment mission. The Sitrep should consist of all the items mentioned below; if there is no information on one or more of the items then state it explicitly (i.e. “Nothing new”).

DATE/TIME
· Hour (Local)/Hour (GMT), Date Month Year

SITUATION
· Nature of the disaster
· Area affected
· Impact
· Projected evolution/secondary threats SITUATION REPORT

IN COUNTRY RESPONSE
· Organization: national and local authorities
· Administrative measures
· Operations
· Constraints

ON-SITE LEVEL INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
· International resources arrived on-site/mobilized
· Coordination
· Constraints

ASSISTANCE
· Priority relief needs

MEANS OF DELIVERY OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE
· Logistics and distribution system
· Possible channels for contributions

OTHER INFORMATION
Street Address, Mailing Address, Telephone, Fax, Email of originator
Annex E

From National Emergency Communications Plan – USA Homeland Security

Introduction

The ability of emergency responders to effectively communicate is paramount to the safety and security of our Nation. During the last three decades, the Nation has witnessed how inadequate emergency communications capabilities can adversely affect response and recovery efforts. Locally, agencies developed ad hoc solutions to overcome these challenges. The issue of inadequate coordination of emergency communications received national attention in the aftermath of the January 1982 passenger jet crash into the 14th Street Bridge (and, subsequently, the Potomac River) near downtown Washington, DC. The inability of multiple jurisdictions to coordinate a response to the Air Florida crash began to drive regional collaboration. More recently, the terrorist attacks of September 11, Hurricane Katrina, and other natural and man-made disasters have demonstrated how emergency communications capabilities—in particular the lack of those capabilities—impact emergency responders, public health, national and economic security, and the ability of government leaders to maintain order and perform essential functions.

During each of these events, the lack of coordinated emergency communications solutions and protocols among the responding agencies hindered response and recovery efforts. These events raised awareness of the issue among public policymakers and highlighted the critical role emergency communications plays in incident response. These events also prompted numerous national studies and assessments on the state of emergency communications, which in turn has helped DHS to formulate a unified approach for addressing emergency communications.

Purpose of the National Emergency Communications Plan

The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended in 2006, mandated the creation of an overarching strategy to address emergency communications shortfalls. In addition, the emergency response community has sought national guidance to support a more integrated coordination of emergency communications priorities and investments.

- Set national goals and priorities for addressing deficiencies in the Nation’s emergency communications posture
- Provide recommendations and milestones for emergency response providers, relevant government officials, and Congress to improve emergency communications capabilities

“Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive natural disaster in U.S. history. The storm crippled thirty-eight 911-call centers, disrupting local emergency services, and knocked out more than 3 million customer phone lines in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Broadcast communications were likewise severely affected, as 50 percent of area radio stations and 44 percent of area television stations went off the air.” White House Report, The Federal Response to Katrina: Lessons Learned, February 2006.

Such as the Final Report of the National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
December 2001; the White House Report, The Federal Response to Katrina: Lessons Learned, February 2006; and the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks—Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission, June 12, 2006, all of which documented the numerous failures in emergency communications among emergency responders, which affected their ability to effectively respond to these incidents. National Emergency Communications Plan July 2008

**National Emergency Communications Plan July 2008**

As a result, Congress directed the DHS’ Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) to develop a plan to:

- Identify the capabilities needed by emergency responders to ensure the availability and interoperability of communications during emergencies, and identify obstacles to the deployment of interoperable communications systems;
- Recommend both short- and long-term solutions for ensuring interoperability and continuity of communications for emergency responders, including recommendations for improving coordination among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments;
- Set goals and timeframes for the deployment of interoperable emergency communications systems, and recommend measures that emergency response providers should employ to ensure the continued operation of communications infrastructure;
- Set dates by which Federal agencies and State, local, and tribal governments expect to achieve a baseline level of national interoperable communications, and establish benchmarks to measure progress; and
- Guide the coordination of existing Federal emergency communications programs.

**Scope of the National Emergency Communications Plan**

The National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) focuses on the emergency communications needs of response personnel in every discipline, at every level of government, and for the private sector and non-governmental organizations (NGO).

Emergency communications is defined as the ability of emergency responders to exchange information via data, voice, and video as authorized, to complete their missions. Emergency response agencies at all levels of government must have interoperable and seamless communications to manage emergency response, establish command and control, maintain situational awareness, and function under a common operating picture, for a broad scale of incidents.

Emergency communications consists of three primary elements:

1. **Operability**—The ability of emergency responders to establish and sustain communications in support of mission operations.
2. **Interoperability**—The ability of emergency responders to communicate among jurisdictions, disciplines, and levels of government, using a variety of frequency bands, as needed and as authorized. System operability is required for system interoperability.
3. Continuity of Communications—The ability of emergency response agencies to maintain communications in the event of damage to or destruction of the primary infrastructure.
WORKING WITH THE MEDIA

Introduction
Good public communication is vital to the successful handling of any incident and should be incorporated in all contingency planning. When an incident occurs the key communications objective is to deliver accurate, clear, timely information and advice to the public.

The news media (broadcasting, print and text services) remain the primary means of communication with the public in these circumstances although websites are increasingly used to provide a further source of more detailed information and advice for the public. Advances in technology mean that live interviews and reports can be sent directly from the scene of an incident via a mobile telephone as the event unfolds. These developments mean there is a constant requirement from the media for accurate, up to date information.

It is essential that the media team:

- identifies the agencies who are responsible for handling various aspects of the situation;
- ensures that media activity does not interfere with the operational activity of the emergency services; and ensures that the media do not harass human casualties.

A mechanism needs to be established early for responding to media enquiries (by telephone, e-mail and fax) and the logistics of arranging the daily press conferences, individual briefings. Media officers, from all responding bodies and organisations, have to take responsibility for these tasks, while others concentrate on the management of the information given to the media which can then be monitored or updated as the situation develops.

Initial Phase

In the first few minutes of the incident, possibly within an hour, it is necessary to establish a local spokesperson (normally a uniformed Coastguard) to give the briefest confirmation of the incident.

If it is clear that the situation is a very serious one and is likely to continue for some time, but there has not been sufficient time to assess the situation, any statements should be brief and factual. They should deal only within the areas of responsibility of the person making them. It is the responsibility of the person in overall charge of the incident to agree the release of further information.

In order to minimise the risk of issuing conflicting or misleading information to the media, and bearing in mind the necessity for fast but accurate information and that press officers are likely to be based at the same location, all agencies should adopt the following approach:

- to inform the agreed initial lead agency press officer before giving verbal statements to the media and to restrict comments to matters concerning the agency that they represent;
- before issuing news releases, to consult with the lead agency press officer. If it proves impossible to contact the lead agency in advance (for example, due to communications difficulties) inform the lead agency as soon as possible afterwards;
- to contact those persons within their own organisation whom the media may contact, or who may wish to make statements, and to brief them on the requirement for co-ordination with the lead agency press officer;
- if and when the incident develops to a different phase (for example, coastline clean up operations) to consider making the lead agency the relevant local authority; and
- when arriving on scene, to liaise urgently with other press officers and to make contact with the lead press officer to ensure that their contact details are quickly available.

Crisis media team
The crisis media team shall consist of those organisations relevant to the incident.

**Managing the incident**
Once the lead agency has been agreed it is necessary to establish certain procedures:

- the initial focus of attention for the media will be the area of operations, and journalists will be searching immediately for information and briefings. During this initial period, when the build up of emergency services resources is taking place, the exercise of control is imperative, as a means of assisting the media;
- all interested parties need to agree joint statements. Press officers from each agency need to consult closely to ensure a coordinated approach to the media;
- it is essential that the lead press officer attends and participates in the senior management arrangements for the incident. By attending such meetings, the press officer can be fully in the picture and plan the media response. The lead press officer oversees all aspects of the media response, including:
  - activities at the media liaison point or centre;
  - arrangements for the media to visit the site, possibly including transport;
  - accreditation of bona fide journalists; and
  - arrangements for overall monitoring of media output.
- initially the media may need a reminder that, in the period immediately following a major incident, nobody can know precisely what has happened. Initial statements should focus on what is happening, what the limitations of knowledge are at the time, and what is being done to arrive at a fuller appreciation of the situation. If such statements include a commitment to provide accurate information as soon as it is available, media personnel are more likely to attend briefings and thus accept a measure of control, particularly if the briefings take place at regular intervals.

**Establishing a media liaison point and centre**
The figure below is a stylised ‘ideal’ set up to cope with shift changes - and media pressure. This presupposes a long-running event that requires substantial resources.

**Media Centre**

*Response Centre Management Group*

The suggested personnel for these positions are the Heads of Public Relations from all the agencies involved. All those responsible from relevant organisations should meet regularly and approve plans for the next, say, 12 hour basis.

Each of these individuals would have a specific area of responsibility within the Media Office:

- Media Centre Manager
- The Media Centre Manager controls and co-ordinates the media centre. The lead agency provides the Media Centre Manager.
- Shift Managers
- On the assumption that the event would be long running, it would be necessary to appoint two shift managers to run the office 24 hours a day. Responsibilities to include the preparation, approval, and distribution of press releases; management of press conferences; and briefing participants.
- Resources Manager
- It is not essential that this person is a Press Officer. The Resources Manager should be someone with knowledge and understanding of communications and systems and with the ability to deliver the support services required by a major operation of the type envisaged. The Resources Manager’s responsibilities would include the logistics of press conferences.

- Information Manager

- This role is crucial for managing the flow of information between Incident Officers, OSCs and the overall commander and the Media Office. The Media Centre Manager may fulfil this role, but it requires the services of reliable assistants to cover shift working and periods when the Manager is involved in other meetings.

Separating delivery from content
Monitoring and analysis of media reporting needs to take place. This should take place elsewhere; for example, by the Government media monitoring unit, or a specifically contracted commercial company.

Monitoring and analysis enables the identification of any trends reported that begin to appear misleading or overly biased. Examples include unbalanced reporting that gives too much emphasis to special interest groups or environmental concerns; undue criticism of local or national government policy; an inaccurate assessment of the situation; exaggeration. The media team can then take corrective action and disseminate transcripts to specialists.
VIP visits
Visits by VIPs, coordinated by the police, can lift the morale of those affected, as well as those who are involved with the response. A government minister may make an early visit to the scene or areas affected, not only to mark public concern but also to be able to report to Parliament on the response. A government minister visiting the scene may also be accompanied by local dignitaries. If foreign nationals have been involved, their country’s Ambassador, High Commissioner or other dignitaries may also want to visit key locations.

Visits to the scene of an emergency need to take account of the local situation and the immediate affects on the local community. It may be inappropriate for VIP visitors to go to a disaster site itself whilst rescue operations are still in progress.

VIP visits should not interrupt rescue and life saving work, and the police must be consulted regarding the timing of visits.
The Press Release Format

You must report in the “third person”. Just like a news release, a press release purports to report on an event, circumstance or occurrence by a third party. When writing a news release, be a reporter and report on yourself or your business.

Third Person Example: “According to John Doe, the next version of Webster’s Dictionary will include two new slang terms that were identified in his research as being part of …”.

Inappropriate Example: “I, John Doe, was informed that the next version of Webster’s Dictionary will include two new slang terms that I identified in my research as being part of …”.

Press releases are most effective when they are under 500 words, generally two to three paragraphs, preceded by a clear and attention grabbing headline.

Remember, this content is intended to be used by the media, so be accurate and reasonably detailed.

(Begin with the text immediately below)
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Headline

Be creative and keep it to one sentence. Capitalize the first letter of all words but do not use all upper case letters. Exclamation marks (“!”) conveys that your release is advertising, not news, and it’s the credibility of news that generates the good publicity.

Paragraph 1

Physical location (country, state, city), Month, Day, Year - Begin with a strong introductory paragraph that captures the reader’s attention and contains the information most relevant to your message such as the “Five W's” of (W)ho, (W)hat, (W)hen, (W)here, and (W)hy, when applicable. This paragraph should summarize the News Release such that if it was the only part seen by a reader, it would tell your entire message, and it should include a hook to get your audience interested in reading more.

Paragraph 2, 3, 4, …

These paragraphs should contain more detailed important information, and make up the body of the release. Pick up with the information provided in your first paragraph, including quotes from key staff, customers or subject matter experts. Make sure you use correct grammar so as not to affect your credibility negatively.

As for content, make sure to keep in mind that you are writing a press release to grab the attention of the media. It is very important to maintain factual accuracy, make sure you are cleared to use quotes or information about businesses, and most importantly have an angle that will appeal to journalists (often by connecting your release to current events or issues). Effective releases usually utilize a strategy known as the inverted pyramid, which is written with the most important information and quotes first.
Try to keep the press release to fewer than 500 words total. Remember, succinct and to the point works best.

The body of your release should be more than one paragraph. The final paragraph should restate and summarize the key points of your release.

Background information about the company featured in the release, if appropriate, as well as any applicable safe harbor statement or disclaimers.

With a WebWire submission, include contact information about the release (name, title, email, telephone, etc.) within the appropriate online form. Make sure it is the person who can answer questions about the release.

(End with these characters immediately below)  
###